

Reading Suggestions – Wolff
For U.S. Grand Strategy in Times of Transition

General:

Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein, eds., *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994),
B.H. Liddell Hart, 'Fundamentals of Strategy and Grand Strategy', in his *Strategy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Faber & Faber, 1967).
Paul Kennedy, ed., *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991) Faber, 1967)
Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987).
Peter Paret with Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986).
Phillip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History* (New York, Random House, 2002).
Niall Ferguson, *Civilization: The West and the Rest* (New York, Penguin, 2011).
Jared Diamond, *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed* (New York, Penguin, 2005).
Robert D. Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and The Battle Against Fate* (New York: Random House, Hardcover, 2012)
Julian Corbett's "Some Principles of Maritime Strategy" pp. 1-13:
<http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15076/15076-h/15076-h.htm>
****SEE** Ike Wilson's HOLISTIC WARRIOR and ESSENTIAL STRATEGIST readings lists (on the Mellon wiki site) for additional sources.

Comment [IW1]: Ike Wilson

Comment [IW2]: Ike Wilson

Course Themes:

- **Power**

Joseph Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York, Public Affairs Books, 2011)
Leslie H. Gelb, *Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper-Collins, 2009)
Francis A. Beer, *The Meanings of War and Peace*, Introduction, pp. 3-22.
a. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* (c.400 B.C.), translated by Richard Crawley, edited by T.E. Wick (New York: The Modern Library Hill, 1982; distributed by McGraw-Hill). [CCL DF229 T5 C73 1982]
<http://classics.mit.edu/Thucydides/pelopwar.html> [Cadet Reading Groups assigned to Books 1-8]
b. August 17, 2009 Dr. Stephen Walt John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
US Foreign Policy & US Power
<http://outerdnn.outer.jhuapl.edu/rethinking/PastSeries/Rethinking20082009.aspx>

****VIDEO:** Joseph Nye TED Talk (Global Power Shifts)
http://www.ted.com/talks/joseph_nye_on_global_power_shifts.html

Comment [IW3]: Ike Wilson

Comment [IW4]: Ike Wilson

Comment [IW5]: Ike Wilson

- **Civil-Military Relations**

Eliot Cohen, "The Unequal Dialogue: The Theory and Reality of Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force," in Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., *Soldiers and Civilians* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 429-458.
Stephen D. Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important (Or Allison Wonderland)?" *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 7 (Summer 1972), pp. 159-179.

Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations* (Harvard Press 2003), pp. 1-95.

H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty* (New York, Harper, 1998).

Dale Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency* (Lawrence, KA, University of Kansas Press, 2005).

Charles Stevenson, *Warriors and Politicians* (New York, Routledge, 2006).

Peter Feaver, *Armed Servants* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2003).

Suzanne Nielsen and Don Snider, eds, *American Civil-Military Relations* (Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn, eds, *Soldiers and Civilians* (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2001).

Comment [IW6]: Doug Stuart

The Profession of Arms. September 2011. *Military Review* (Special Edition)
Cox, Park, Sondheimer, and Wilson, "Growing Military Professionalism Across Generations"

<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/repository/MREditions2011-English.xml#wrapper>

"One Man's Military-Industrial-Media Complex

<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/washington/30general.html?pagewanted=all>

"The Runaway General: The Rolling Stone profile of Stanley McChrystal that changed history"

Read more: <http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-runaway-general-20100622#ixzz1nmpmZ4CL>

<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/washington/30general.html?pagewanted=all>

Snider, Don and Gayle Watkins (eds.). *The Future of the Army Profession*. New York: McGraw-Hill Primis Custom Publishing; 1 edition (April 8, 2002). 2nd Edition (2004). [FROM THE PUBLISHER] ~ Who are the future members of the Army profession and how is their competence to be certified to their client, the American people? This is a contemporary analysis of the Army profession, its knowledge and expertise, with conclusions and policy recommendations.

Comment [IW7]: Ike Wilson

- Leadership

Eliot Cohen, *Supreme Command* (New York, Free Press, 2002).

Michael Howard, ed., *Restraints on War: Studies in the Limitation of Armed Conflict* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1979).

Murray, Williamson, and Jim Lacey, eds. *The Making of Peace: Rulers, States, and the Aftermath of War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Comment [IW8]: Doug Stuart

- **Economics**

Robert Gilpin, *War & Change in World Politics*, Chapter 1 ("The Nature of International Political Change"), pp. 9-49. (Reprint)

Comment [IW9]: Ike Wilson

Poast, Paul. *The Economics of War*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005. This is the only academic textbook to make this "conversational-30ish" list, and one of few textbooks that make any of my more comprehensive reading lists. It is an important inclusion here for its simple step-by-step explanation of the economics of war-policy.

Friedman, Thomas, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999. [From Amazon.com] ~ Friedman, the well-traveled New York Times foreign-affairs columnist, peppers *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* with stories that illustrate his central theme: that globalization--the Lexus--is the central organizing principle of the post-cold war world, even though many individuals and nations resist by holding onto what has traditionally mattered to them--the olive tree. Problem is, few of us understand what exactly globalization means. As Friedman sees it, the concept, at first glance, is all about American hegemony, about Disneyfication of all corners of the earth. But the reality, thank goodness, is far more complex than that, involving international relations, global markets, and the rise of the power of individuals (Bill Gates, Osama Bin Laden) relative to the power of nations.

Yergin and Stanislaw. *The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World*. New York: Simon & Shuster, 1998. From Amazon.com ~ The "commanding heights," according to Pulitzer Prize-winner Daniel Yergin and international business advisor Joseph Stanislaw, are those dominant enterprises and industries that form the high economic ground in nations around the globe. In their analysis of the new world economy, *The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace That Is Remaking the Modern World*, they examine "the individuals, the ideas, the conflicts, and the turning points" that are responsible. And by considering events such as the ongoing Asian monetary crisis, they suggest what the ultimate interconnection of financial markets might mean in the future.

Comment [IW10]: Ike Wilson

Gregory Clark, *A Farewell to Alms* (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 2008).

- **International Environment**

Jeffrey W. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005) pp. 1-48.

Robert D. Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and The Battle Against Fate* (New York: Random House, Hardcover, 2012)

Thomas Friedman's *Lexus and Olive Tree* and *Longitudes and Latitudes*

Comment [IW11]: Ike Wilson

Comment [IW12]: Ike Wilson

Thomas Barnett's *The Pentagon's New Map*
Bobbitt, *Shield of Achilles*, pp. 353-480. Change: Prologue; pp. 5-17; pp. 353-410

Secondary-Supplemental:

Phillip Bobbitt, *Shield of Achilles*, Chapters 17-22 (pp. 481-608) and Chapter 23 (pp. 609-663).

Christine Gray, *International Law and the Use of Force*.

Howard M. Hensel, ed., *The Law of Armed Conflict: Constraints on the Contemporary Use of Armed Force*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate Press, 2005.

Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, eds., *Documents on the Laws of War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000

Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah, *God's Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics*. New York: WW Norton, 2011.

Scott M. Thomas. *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Neil J. Kressel, *Bad Faith: The Danger of Religious Extremism*. New York: Prometheus Books, 2007.

Comment [glr13]: Lee Robinson

Comment [IW14]: Ike Wilson

- **Domestic Context**

Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 1-20; 31-55.

William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, "Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force," *International Organization* 59, No. 1 (Winter 2005), pp. 209-232.

James M. Lindsay, 2003, "Deference and Defiance: The Shifting Rhythms of Executive-Legislative Relations in Foreign Policy" *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 33(3), pp. 530-546.

Matthew Baum and Philip Potter, "The Relationship between Mass Media, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2008.

Ole R. Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*. Michigan: University of Michigan Press (2004), pp. 23-56.

John Aldrich, Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, Jason Reifler, and Kristin Thompson. "Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection," *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 (2006), pp. 477-502.

Douglas C. Foyle, *Counting the Public In: Presidents, Opinion, and Foreign Policy* (1999).

John C. Tower, "Congress versus the President: The Formulation and Implementation of American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 60, No. 2 (Winter 1981), pp. 229-246.

Roger George and Harvey Rishikof, *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2011) –

- George & Rishikof, Ch.2 "The Evolution of the NSC Process."
- George & Rishikof, Ch. 3—OMB
- George & Rishikof, Ch 4—State Department
- George & Rishikof, Ch 5—OSD
- George & Rishikof, Ch 6—The Military: Joint Culture
- George & Rishikof, Ch 7—DNI
- George & Rishikof, Ch 8—CIA
- George & Rishikof, Ch 9—Evolving FBI
- George & Rishikof, Ch 10—DHS
- George & Rishikof, Ch 11—Congress
- George & Rishikof, Ch 12—U.S. Supreme Court
- George & Rishikof, Ch 13—Lobbyists
- George & Rishikof, Ch 14—Think Tanks
- George & Rishikof, Ch 15—The Media

Comment [IW15]: Ike Wilson

- Theory/theorists/practitioners

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (6th cent. B.C.), translated by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford UP, 1963).

Edward Mead Earle, with Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971).

Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1996).

Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince* (1513-1514), translated and with an introduction by Harvey C. Mansfield, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). Full text, pp. 1-111.

Isaiah Berlin "The Originality of Machiavelli," in his *The Proper Study of Mankind* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997): 269-325.

Harvey C. Mansfield, *Machiavelli's Virtue* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1651), edited and with an introduction by C.B. MacPherson (London: Penguin, 1968),

Hans Reiss, ed., *Kant: Political Writings*, translated by H.B. Nisbet, 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

Comment [HPL16]: For the most important (within political theory) alternative to Mansfield's approach to Machiavelli, see: Quentin Skinner, *Machiavelli (A Brief Insight)* (Sterling, 2010).

Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Knopf, 1993).

Azar Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).

Michael I. Handel, ed., *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy* (London: Frank Cass, 1986).

Michael Howard, *Clausewitz* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).

Otto Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany*, vol. 1., *The Period of Unification*, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990).

Henry Kissinger, 'The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck', *Daedalus* 97, no. 3 (Summer 1968): 888-924.

Kenneth W. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*. Introduction and IV and V, pp.80-158.

Comment [IW17]: Doug Stuart

Comment [IW18]: Ike Wilson

- Values

Hans J. Morgenthau, "Elements of National Power," UIR 4th ed., pp. 205-234.

Robert J. Art, "The Four Functions of Force," UIR 4th edition, pp. 77-83.

Woodrow Wilson, *The Fourteen Points*. Electronic-provided at:

<http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/1918/14points.html>

Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," UIR 4th ed., pp. 169-185.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights [On-line] available at <

<http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>> accessed 5 October 2007.

Robert O. Keohane, "Cooperation and International Regimes," UIR 4th ed., pp. 457-470.

Introduction to 'Collective Security'. UIR 4th ed., pp. 337-380. Three articles:

Inis L. Claude, Jr., "Collective Security as an Approach to Peace."

_____. "Collective Security versus Balance of Power."

Bruce Russett, "Why Democratic Peace?"

Comment [IW19]: Ike Wilson

On "American" Values –

Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence:*

- pp. 3-29 – "The American Foreign Policy Tradition"
- pp. 99-131 – "The Hamiltonian Way"
- pp. 131-173 – "Wilsonianism and its Mission"
- pp. 174-217 – "The Jeffersonian Tradition"
- pp. 218-263 – "The School of Andrew Jackson"

Isaiah Wilson III. *Thinking Beyond War: Civil-Military Relations and Why America Fails to Win the Peace*, Preface and Introduction, pp. xiv-xxvii and pp.1-19.

Ellis Sandoz, *A Government of Laws: Political Theory, Religion, and the*

American Founding

Comment [glr20]: Lee Robinson

Comment [IW21]: Ike Wilson

- **Interests**

On 'Peace' as Objective of War ... Philip Bobbitt's Shield of Achilles, ...
page 479; pp. 481-485 – Introductory
pp. 501-519 (Peace of Westphalia)
pp. 520-537 (Treaty of Utrecht)
pp. 538-569 (Congress of Vienna)
pp. 570-608 (Treaty of Versailles)
pp. 609-663 (Peace of Paris)

Comment [IW22]: Ike Wilson

- **Ends / ways / means**

Stephen Van Evera, *The Causes of War*, Introduction, pp. 1-13; Chapter 6 (skim), pp. 117-190.

Peter Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*, London: Frank Cass, 1996.

Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Jan Angstrom. "Introduction: Debating the Nature of Modern War," in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom, eds., *Rethinking the Nature of War*, London: Frank Cass, 2005, pp. 1-27.

Comment [IW23]: Ike Wilson

"New Wars, Old Warfare? Comparing US Tactics in Vietnam and Afghanistan," in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom, eds., *Rethinking the Nature of War*, London: Frank Cass, 2005, pp. 135-158.

Comment [IW24]: Ike Wilson

Neuman and Harkavy. 2001. *Warfare in the Third World*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 5, pp. 189-232.

Harkavy and Neuman, Chapter 2, pp. 45-64; 116-188

Comment [IW25]: Ike Wilson

Military Strategy

"Evolutions and Revolutions in Military Affairs" (The RMA)

a. Max Boot, *War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History—1500 to Today*. 2006. New York: Gotham Books, Prologue (pp.1-6); Introduction ("Revolutions in Military Affairs" pp. 7-18); "The Rise of the Gunpowder Age" (pp. 19-25); "The Consequences of the Gunpowder Revolution" (pp. 103-108); "The Rise of the Industrial Age" (pp.109-115); "The Consequences of the Industrial Revolution" (pp. 196-204); "The Rise of the Second Industrial Age" (pp. 205-211); "The Consequences of the Second Industrial Revolution" (pp. 295-306); "The Rise of the Information Age" (pp. 307-317); "The Consequences of the Information Revolution" (pp. 419-438).

- b. Wilson III, Isaiah. "America's Anabasis," Chapter 1, in Thomas G. Mahnken and Thomas A. Keaney (eds.), *War in Iraq: Planning and Execution*. 2007. New York: Routledge, pp. 9-21.
- c. Wilson III, Isaiah. "Rediscovering the Way of Lawrence," Chapter 12, in Thomas G. Mahnken and Thomas A. Keaney (eds.), *War in Iraq: Planning and Execution*. 2007. New York: Routledge, pp. 227-245.

Comment [IW26]: Ike Wilson

Geopolitics

H.J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History", *Geographical Journal* 23, no. 6 (April 1904): pp. 421-423, 432-437.

A.T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (1890) (New York: Dover Publications, 1987).

Harm de Blij, *Why Geography Matters: Three Challenges Facing America* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2005)

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1915

Bobbitt, Shield of Achilles, pp. 353-480. Prologue, pp. 5-17; pp. 353-410.

Comment [IW27]: Ike Wilson

H.J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History", *Geographical Journal* 23, no. 6 (April 1904): pp. 421-423, 432-437, and commentary.

H.J. Mackinder, "The Rivalry of Empires," in his *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction* (1919) (New York: Henry Holt, 1942), Ch. 5.

A.T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (1890) (New York: Dover Publications, 1987), "Introduction, pp. 1-12" and "Elements of Seapower", ch. 1, pp. 25-89. <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/13529/13529-h/13529-h.htm>

Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, by Julian Corbett, <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15076/15076-h/15076-h.htm>

"The Clash of Civilizations?" by Samuel P. Huntington, *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993 issue, p. 22-49.

"The New Geography of Conflict," by Michael T. Klare, Chapter 28, *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th Edition, Naval War College, pp. 418-426.

"The Market for Civil War," by Paul Collier, Chapter 31, *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th Edition, Naval War College, pp. 461-468.

Additional Recommended:

B.H. Liddell Hart, "The True Object in War" (21 December 1939), LH 11/1939/137, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London.

B.H. Liddell Hart, "War and Peace" (14 September 1940), LH 11/1940/87, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College London.
Wilson III, Isaiah. "Military Intervention and International Law," in Reveron and Steihm, eds., *Inside Defense*, New York, NY: Routledge Press, 2008.

Comment [IW28]: Ike Wilson

Decision Points / Foreign Policy Decision Making

Jeffrey Record, *Making War, Thinking History* (Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 2002).
Douglas Stuart, "Foreign Policy Decision Making," in *Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008) edited by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal.

Principles and Foundations of Grand Strategy: Thucydides

Strassler, Robert B., ed. *The Landmark Thucydides*. New York: The Free Press, 1996.

Plutarch. *The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek Lives*. Translated with an introduction by Ian Scott-Kilvert. New York and London: Penguin, 1960.

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* (c.400 B.C.), translated by Richard Crawley, edited by T.E. Wick (New York: The Modern Library Hill, 1982)

G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London: Duckworth, 1972).

Victor Davis Hanson, *A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and the Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War*. (New York: Random House, 2005).

Laurie Bagby, 'The Use and Abuse of Thucydides', *International Organization* 48, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 131-53.
Donald Kagan, *The Peloponnesian War* (New York: Viking Press, 2003)

Donald Kagan, *Thucydides: The Reinvention of History* (New York: Viking Press, 2009)

Robert D. Kaplan, "A Historian For Our Time," *The Atlantic Monthly*, January-February 2007.

Clifford Orwin, *The Humanity of Thucydides* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

Comment [HPL29]: An excellent political theory-oriented study of Thucydides.

An interesting counterpoint re. relevance of Thucydides to contemporary IR (and GS?): David Welch, "Why International Relations Theorists Should Stop Reading Thucydides," *Review of International Studies* 29, no. 3 (2003): 301-19.

Principles and Foundations: Historical Surveys

Polybius, *The Rise of the Roman Empire*, translated by Ian Scott-Kilvert (New York: Penguin Books, 1979).

Edward Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (New York: Penguin Classics, 1994).

Julius Caesar, *The Conquest of Gaul* (New York: Penguin Classics, 1983), translated by S. A. Handford

Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

Edward N. Luttwak, *Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979)

Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

Kalevi Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991).

David Kaiser, *Politics and War: European Conflict From Philip II to Hitler* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990).

Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000* (New York: Vintage Books, 1987).

Geoffrey Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

Paul Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (London: Macmillan, 1976).

Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored* (New York, Grosset and Dunlap, 1964).

Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

Francis A. Boyle, *Foundations of World Order: The Legalist Approach to International Relations, 1898-1922* (Place: Duke University Press, 1999).

René Albrecht-Carrié, *A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna* (New York: Harper and Row, 1958).
Edward Vose Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1955).

Paul W. Schroeder, 'Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?', *American Historical Review* 97, no. 3 (Jun. 1992): 683-706.

Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1980).

A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).

Kenneth Bourne, *The Foreign Policy of Victorian Britain: 1830-1902* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970).

C.J. Lowe, *The Reluctant Imperialists: British Foreign Policy, 1878-1902*, vol. 2, *The Documents* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967).

Michael Howard, *The Continental Commitment* (London: Ashfield Press, 1989).

John Charmley, *Splendid Isolation?: Britain, the Balance of Power and the Origins of the First World War* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1999).

Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (London: A. Lane, 1976).

B.H. Liddell Hart, *The British Way in Warfare* (London: Faber & Faber, 1932)

David French, *The British Way in Warfare, 1688-2000* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990).

Aaron L. Friedberg, *The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).

Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996).

Rothenberg, Gunther E. *The Napoleonic Wars*. New York: Collins, 2006.

Craig, Gordon A. *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945*. New York:

Oxford University Press, 1964.

Kennedy, Paul M., ed. *The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1979.

Fromkin, David. *A Peace to End All Peace*. New York: Henry Holt, 1989.

Murray, Williamson, and Allan R. Millett, eds. *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996

Strategy and the State

a. Donald Kagan, "Athenian strategy in the Peloponnesian War," *The Making of Strategy*, pp. 24-55.

- b. Arther Ferrill, "The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire," *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, pp. 71-86.
- c. Montesquieu, *Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and Their Decline*, pp. 1-42, 67-78, 91-99, 157-220.
http://www.constitution.org/cm/ccgrd_1.htm
- d. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, pp. 39-44, 63-149

Comment [IW30]: Ike Wilson

Hopkirk, Peter. *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia*. New York: Kodansha

Press, 1990. Hopkirk here tells the tale of the nineteenth-century Russian-British face-off in Asia. Peter Hopkirk, a former reporter for *The Times of London* with wide experience of the region, tells an extraordinary story of ambition, intrigue, and military adventure. His sensational narrative moves at breakneck pace, yet even as he paints his colorful characters—tribal chieftains, generals, spies, Queen Victoria herself—he skillfully provides a clear overview of the geographical and diplomatic framework. *The Great Game* was Russia's version of America's "Manifest Destiny" to dominate a continent, and Hopkirk is careful to explain Russian viewpoints as fully as those of the British. The story ends with the fall of Tsarist Russia in 1917, but the demise of the Soviet Empire (hastened by a decade of bloody fighting in Afghanistan) gives it new relevance, as world peace and stability are again threatened by tensions in this volatile region of great mineral wealth and strategic significance. —John Stevenson

Carr, E.H.. *The Twenty-Years' Crisis*. [By Nicholas Eberstadt and Joseph P. Ferguson] ~ E. H. Carr's powerful little book *The Twenty Years' Crisis* presciently argued that the events ineluctably leading Europe to war in 1939 were not sudden and new, but rather two decades in the making. Though written in another time and of another place, *The Twenty Years' Crisis* could be offered as briefing material today for those policymakers and students of international affairs struggling to make sense of the rapid escalation of present-day crises and security dilemmas.

Linn, William. *The Philippine War: 1899-1902*. Leavenworth: Kansas University Press, 2000. From *Publishers Weekly* ~ Linn, a professor of military history at the U.S. Army War College, enhances his position as the leading authority on America's military presence in the Pacific before Pearl Harbor in this well-written, comprehensively researched monograph. Without justifying the annexation itself, Linn demonstrates that the Filipino nationalists enjoyed at best limited popular support and did as much as the U.S. commanders in the islands to provoke a shooting war as an alternative to negotiation. Operationally, U.S. forces were well led, fought hard, and took advantage of repeated Filipino mistakes in both conventional and unconventional warfare. None of insurgent leader Emilio Aguinaldo's lieutenants were able to combine regular and partisan warfare effectively or to build on local successes. Linn's demonstration of the fighting power of regular troops and the short-service national volunteers who succeeded them does much to correct the bias in favor of the regulars that dominates the literature. As Linn shows, however, military success was only half of the war. Civic action was the other element of victory. The Americans built hospitals, opened schools and restored order. When necessary, they sustained that order with punitive measures, including torture. Without whitewashing individual incidents, Linn shows that both the general customs of warfare and U.S. civil and military law allowed for exponentially higher levels of physical coercion than their present-day counterparts. If the U.S. annexation of the Philippines was an exercise in imperialism, Linn makes a convincing case that by 1902 the U.S. government of the island was nevertheless legitimate both *de jure* and *de facto*.

Halberstam, David. *War in a Time of Peace*. New York: Scribner Press, 1997. [From *SimonSays.com*, a *Simon & Schuster, Inc.* review] ~ Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist David Halberstam chronicles Washington politics and foreign policy in post Cold War America. Evoking the internal conflicts, unchecked egos, and power struggles within the White House, the State Department, and the military, Halberstam shows how the decisions of men who served in the Vietnam War, and those who did not, have shaped America's role in global events. He provides fascinating portraits of those in power — Clinton, Bush, Reagan, Kissinger, James Baker, Dick Cheney, Madeleine Albright, and others — to reveal a stunning view of modern political America.

Bobbitt, Philip. *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History*. New York: Anchor Books, 2002. [From <http://www.fsmithia.com/review/r-bobit.html>] In his book *The Shield of Achilles* Bobbitt describes the coming together of revolutions in warfare and revolutions in government — a "global dynamic" from the Middle Ages into the twenty-first century. And, he has said, the book, is about "preparing for an uncertain future."

Operational Art & Science —

Operational Art & Science

Svechin, Aleksandr Andreevich. *Strategy*. Minneapolis: Eastview Press, 1991. [From a review by Gregory F. Treverton, Foreign Affairs, *Fall 1992*] Svechin's works and life were lost in the purges of the 1930s, but he has been rediscovered, not least by Andrei Kokoshin, the chief civilian in Russia's new defense ministry. This book, originally written in 1927, is remarkably free of Soviet dogma and prophetic in its foreshadowing of civil-military relations.

Liddell Hart, B.H. *Strategy*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Liddell Hart's strategy of the indirect approach has been a staple of strategic discussion for many years. It's simple enough – avoid resistance, maximize surprise, hit the weak points. Decide for yourself how useful or relevant this strategy may be today.

T.E. Lawrence's *Twenty-Seven Articles*. [From T.X. Hammes, *Washington Post*, Sunday, July 17, 2005; Page BW09] Another of Lawrence's works, the bluntly practical *Twenty Seven Articles* (1917), is also frequently quoted. In particular, practitioners have come to value his caution, earned out of painful experience spurring Arab troops to fight the Ottoman Empire. "Do not try to do too much with your own hands," Lawrence warned. "Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them." *Twenty Seven Articles* is widely recommended as a kind of Cliff's Notes for conveying some of the insights of *Seven Pillars*.

Heller & Stofft (eds.). *America's First Battles, 1776-1965*. Leavenworth: Kansas University Press, 1986. [From <http://fp.arizona.edu/armyrotc/rotc/readinglist.htm>] ~ The first battle in any war, argue the various authors of this book, may reveal the strengths and weaknesses of armies—both winners and losers. *America's First Battles* examines the first major engagement of each of America's nine major wars—from the Revolution through Vietnam—with an eye toward the weaknesses revealed. Faulty doctrine, insufficient command-and-control, and, most importantly, preparedness, are all discussed. Was the U.S. Army ready for each of its wars? If not, did it learn quickly from its mistakes? Each essay considers the strategic and political background of the conflict, and the circumstances in which the U.S. Army found itself when the war began, all intertwined with a detailed combat narrative. How an army prepares for war during peacetime is often a good indicator of how well it will perform in the first battle of the next war. This is a valuable perspective for an Army officer to possess, even if hindsight is 20-20. Several trends are made clear by the essays in this book. For example, drastic demobilization following each conflict is a familiar theme throughout U.S. history, and it has affected the Army's ability to fight many of its first battles. Rapid and deep cuts in manpower following World War II affected military readiness to such an extent that the Army was largely unprepared for the Korean War. Yet at other times the Army was prepared. It was a fit and ready Expeditionary Corps that first fought in France in 1918, as was the Army in Vietnam in 1965. What did the Army do wrong? What did it do right? The continuum of answers is enlightening.

Summers, Harry G.. *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*. Novato: Presidio Press, 1982. [From <http://fp.arizona.edu/armyrotc/rotc/readinglist.htm>] ~ A critical examination of the military in Vietnam. The author suggests that the military and political strategists might have fared better had they adhered more closely to the preeminent theorist of strategy, Carl von Clausewitz.

Contemporary Strategic Thought

Hart, Gary. *The Shield and the Cloak: The Security of the Commons*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. From *Publishers Weekly* ~ Former Senator Hart argues in this treatise the future of national security that 9/11 was an "opportunity to redefine America's role in the world," but one the U.S. is misusing "by waging preemptive warfare in the Middle East and thus possibly increasing the threat." Hart proposes the military abandon traditional notions of warfare ("Fast fighters, giant carriers, monster tanks, big missiles") in favor of increasing the number of special forces units that can be deployed quickly and quietly against insurgents whose organization is akin to "cancerous cells." Hart would have the National Guard, no longer required as an invasion and occupation force, recast as a "homeland security shield." This is an accessible and stimulating read for those interested in national security, politics and terrorism.

Etzioni, Amitai. *From Empire to Community*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. [From a review by G. John Ikenberry, Foreign Affairs, *September/October 2004*] In this sweeping vision of an emerging world community, Etzioni, a distinguished sociologist and leading communitarian thinker, lays out a world order that charts a path between power-oriented realism and law-oriented liberalism. It is a vision in which U.S. power is closely tied to a wider global community infused with shared values and bolstered by legitimate institutions of governance.

Comment [IW31]: Ike Wilson

Principles and Foundations of Grand Strategy: Domestic Contexts

Amy Zegart, *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC* (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1999).

Harold Hongju Koh, *The National Security Constitution* (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1990).

Joel Aberbach and Mark Peterson, *The Executive Branch* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2005).

Douglas Stuart, *Creating the National Security State* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2008).

Comment [IW32]: Doug Stuart

Course Outline:

1. Definition of Grand Strategy.

Richard Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?" *International Security* 25(2), Fall 2000, pp. 5-50.

Abstract: Does strategy exist? The skeptics say no: The realities of war—its boundless complexities and uncertainties—make effective strategy impossible. Others who respond positively nonetheless disagree on strategy's central features and its ability to influence the outcome of war. Defining strategy as "a plan for using military means to achieve political ends," Richard Betts of Columbia University examines ten critiques of the practicability of strategy and responds to each. Betts concludes that the prospects for successfully implementing a particular strategy are weak at best. With this qualification in mind, Betts then outlines several scenarios in which strategy can work.

Paul Kennedy, ed., "Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition," in Kennedy, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991, pp. 1-6.

John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, Norton, 2001, pp. 1-54.

Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, "Introduction: On Strategy," in Murray, Knox, and Bernstein, *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* (1994), pp. 1-23.

Ronald Dannreuther, *International Security: The Contemporary Agenda*, "Chapter 2: Thinking about security after the Cold War," Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007, pp. 13-33.

The Meanings of Strategy

a. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, preface and introduction.

b. B.H. Liddell Hart, 'Fundamentals of Strategy and Grand Strategy', in his *Strategy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Faber & Faber, 1967), part XIX. pp. 319-333 (RESERVE);

c. Wilson III, Isaiah. "The Dialectic of Strategy and Tactics," Ch-2 in "Educating the Postmodern Army Strategist," SAMS monograph, 2003. --

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/sam/strategists_wilson.pdf

**VIDEO: [On Statesmanship] GPS (11/14/10) --

<http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/podcasts/fareedzakaria/site/2010/11/14/gps.podcast.11.14.cnn> [interview w/ George Shultz]

d. Walter Russell Mead, "US Grand Strategy: From Theory to Practice"

<http://outerdnn.outer.jhuapl.edu/rethinking/VideoArchives/MeadVideo.aspx>

Comment [IW33]: Ike Wilson

2. Principles and Foundations of Grand Strategy I: International Contexts

Julian Corbett's "Some Principles of Maritime Strategy" pp. 1-13:
<http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15076/15076-h/15076-h.htm>

Comment [IW34]: Ike Wilson

3. Principles and Foundations of Grand Strategy II: Domestic Contexts

Bolt, Coletta, and Shackelford, eds., *American Defense Policy*. 2005. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, Ch-1 "American Defense in the Context of History and Values," pp. 5-30; Ch-4 "The Constitutional and Legal Basis for American Defense and National Security," pp. 87-126.

Comment [IW35]: Ike Wilson

4. The American Revolution and Post-Revolutionary Transition / Competing Strategies for a New American Nation

The Declaration of Independence and Preamble to the U.S. Constitution

John Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1990.
- Chapter 5, "American Society and Its War for Independence," pg. 117-132.
- Chapter 6, "American Strategy: Charles Lee and the Radical Alternative," pg. 133-162.
- Chapter 11, "The Legacy of the American Revolutionary War," pg. 245-265.

Comment [IW36]: Ike Wilson

Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution*. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers. 1988.

- Chapter 1, "The World the War Made," pgs. 1-34.
- Chapter 2, "Rehearsals for Reconstruction," pgs. 35-76.
- Chapter 5, "The Failure of Presidential Reconstruction," pgs. 176-227.
- Chapter 8, "Reconstruction: Political and Economic," pgs. 346-411.
- Chapter 12, "Redemption and After," pgs. 564-601.

Comment [IW37]: Ike Wilson

George Washington, "Farewell Address," 1796.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp

Monroe Doctrine, December 2, 1823.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/monroe.asp

5. Consolidation and Expansion: US Grand Strategy from the End of the Civil War to World War I

David Brion Davis, *Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery*. New York:

- Chapter 14, "The Politics of Slavery in the United States," pgs. 268-296;
- Chapter 15, "The Civil War and Emancipation," pgs. 297-321.

James E. Sefton, *The United States Army and Reconstruction: 1865-1877*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966.

John Hay's "Open Door Note" September 6, 1899.

<https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/opendoor.htm>

Norman Rich, "The Great Power Competition over China" in *Great Power Diplomacy, 1814-1914* (McGraw Hill, 1992): pp. 300-328.

Frank Ninkovich, "The Emergence of Normal Internationalism, 1900-1913," from *The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1900* (Chicago 2001), pp. 17-47

Russell Weigley, "A Strategy of Sea Power and Empire: Stephen B. Luce and Alfred Thayer Mahan," in Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 167-91.

Warren Zimmermann, *First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made their Country a World Power* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002).

Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York: Knopf, 2001), Ch.1 pp. 3-29.

Bolt, Coletta, and Shackelford, eds., *American Defense Policy*. 2005. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, Ch-1 "American Defense in the Context of History and Values," pp. 5-30; Ch-4 "The Constitutional and Legal Basis for American Defense and National Security," pp. 87-126.

WRM, *Special Providence*:

- pp. 99-131 – "The Hamiltonian Way"
- pp. 131-173 – "Wilsonianism and its Mission"
- pp. 174-217 – "The Jeffersonian Tradition"
- pp. 218-263 – "The School of Andrew Jackson"

Comment [IW38]: Ike Wilson

6. **World War I and its Aftermath: Versailles** (Option here: simulation or debate)

Winston Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*

Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World*, New York: Random House, 2003.

Woodrow Wilson, *Fourteen Points*, January 8, 1918.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp

"The British Way in Warfare," Chapters 2 AND 3 in Kennedy's *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*

John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Nineteenth Century', in his *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004);

Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York: Knopf, 2001), pp. 99-131

**FILM: Paris 1919

Comment [IW39]: Ike Wilson

John Gooch, "The Weary Titan: Strategy and Policy in Great Britain, 1890-1918," in *The Making of Strategy*, pp. 278-306

Williamson Murray, "The Collapse of empire: British Strategy, 1919-1945," in *The Making of Strategy*. (skim pp. 393-427)

John Maynard Keynes, 'Introductory' in Keynes' *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (New York: Dover Publications, 1920), pp. 1-6;
The Treaty of Versailles, 1919 -- <http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/versailles.html>

Comment [IW40]: Ike Wilson

7. Creation of Post-World War II Liberal Order (Ikenberry)

Atlantic Charter, August 14, 1941. <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp>

D. Deudney and J. G. Ikenberry, "The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order," *Review of International Studies* 25(2) (1999): 179-196.

Abstract. Debates about the future of relations among the advanced industrial countries after the Cold War hinge on theories about the sources of international political order. Realism advances the most defined--and pessimistic--answers drawing on theories of anarchy, balance, and hegemony. But these theories are not able to explain the origins and continuing stability of relations among the United States and its European and Asian partners. This article develops a theory of liberal international order that captures its major structures, institutions, and practices. Distinctive features mark postwar liberal order--co-binding security institutions, penetrated American hegemony, semi-sovereign great powers, economic openness, and civic identity. It is these multifaceted and interlocking features of Western liberal order that give it a durability and significance.

John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton Press, 2001), Chapters 3 and 6, pp. 50-79 and 163-214.

Paul Kennedy, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*. 1991. Ch. 4 "Churchill and Coalition Strategy in World War II," pp. 43-70.

Henry Kissinger, 'The Hinge: Theodore Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson', in his *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), chapter 2, pp. 29-55.

Henry Kissinger, 'Three Approaches to Peace: Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill in World War II', in his *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), chapter 16;

Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York: Knopf, 2001), Ch.5 pp. 131-173.

Woodrow Wilson's 14-Points --

http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson%27s_Fourteen_Points

Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 -- <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/kbpact.htm>

Comment [IW41]: Ike Wilson

8. Cold War Strategy (Containment & Deterrence)

"A Report to the National Security Council -- NSC 68," April 12, 1950.

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/sectioned.php?pagenumber=1&documentdate=1950-04-12&documentid=10-1 or

<https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68/nsc68-1.htm>

X (George Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 25, No. 4 (1947), pp. 566-582.

Truman Doctrine, March 12, 1947, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp

John Lewis Gaddis, "Kennan and American Grand Strategy during the Cold War,"

address at the Naval War College, October 3, 2011,

<http://www.usnwc.edu/Events/ELS/John-Lewis-Gaddis.aspx>

- Melvin Leffler, "The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan," *Diplomatic History* 12 (Summer 1988), pp. 277-306.
- Wilson D. Miscamble, "Roosevelt, Truman, and the Development of Postwar Grand Strategy," *Orbis* 53, no. 4 (Fall 2009), pp. 553-570.
 Abstract. After its victory in World War II, it was clear that United States should move beyond the disastrous policies of the 1930s, but it was less clear how. Ultimately, a lasting postwar strategy was forged under President Truman. Appreciating how Truman moved well beyond Roosevelt's guiding assumptions is essential to understanding the evolution of American grand strategy. One sees that wartime planning and grand strategy formulation can prove quite inadequate for dealing with postwar challenges. An administration cannot be locked into assumptions, but must constantly test them. Thus, the Truman administration eventually developed and adopted containment and moved far beyond FDR's approach. More substantively, the fundamental geopolitical lesson of World War II and the early Cold War was that the United States must assume the essential balancing role relative to other major powers.
- Charles L. Mee, *The Marshall Plan and the Launching of the Pax Americana*, Simon and Schuster (1984).
- H. W. Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," *American Historical Review* 94 (1989), pp. 963-989.
- Steven Metz, "Eisenhower and the Planning of American Grand Strategy," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 14 (March 1991), pp. 49-71.
- Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986

9. Post-Cold War Transition

- Hal Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad: America's Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War World*, Lexington, Kentucky, University of Kentucky Press, 2008.
- Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70, No. 1 (Winter 1990/1991), pp. 23-33.
- John Gerald Ruggie, "Third Try at World Order? America and Multilateralism after the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly* 109, No. 4 (Autumn 1994), pp. 553-570.
- Tony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement," remarks at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, September 21, 1993.
- G. John Ikenberry, "The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos," *Foreign Affairs* 75, No. 3 (May/June 1996), pp. 79-91.
- Jeremi Suri, "American Grand Strategy from the Cold War's End to 9/11" *Orbis* 53 (Fall 2009), pp. 611-629.
 Abstract: Grand strategy is about making sense of complexity; it is the wisdom to make power serve useful purposes. After the end of the Cold War, American policymakers sought to create a new grand strategy for the United States, but they failed in this endeavor. They failed because of difficult domestic and international circumstances. They also failed because of conceptual limitations. This article traces the efforts at strategy formulation in the administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, and it analyzes their shortcomings. Bush had process without purpose; Clinton had purpose without process. The article encourages readers to think about how future strategists might improve upon this legacy with clearer and more disciplined attention to priorities, capabilities, and trade-offs. Making grand strategy in a democracy is not easy, but it is necessary. The absence of effective grand strategy in the 1990s contributed to the crises of the early twenty-first century.

Bolt, Coletta, and Shackelford, eds., *American Defense Policy*. 2005. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, Ch-3 "American Defense and Security in the International Environment," pp. 47-82.; ADP (Ch-3), pp. 47-82.

Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York: Knopf, 2001), Ch.8 "The Rise and Retreat of the New World Order," pp. 264-309.

Paul Kennedy, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*. 1991. Ch. 10 "American Grand Strategy, Today and Tomorrow: Learning from the European Experience," pp. 167-184. (WEB)

Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York: Knopf, 2001), Ch.9 "The Future of American Foreign Policy," pp. 310-334.

1990 Treaty of Paris (WEB)

Wilson III. Isaiah. "Dueling Regimes: International Legal Constraints Versus Humanist Intervention," in Isaiah Wilson III and James Forest, eds., *Handbook of Defence Politics: International and Comparative Perspectives*, New York, NY: Routledge Press, 2008.

(WEB)

Video: Secretary of State Hilary Clinton Keynote Address, National Democracy Institute (2011)

**VIDEO: Samantha Power Ted Talk

Comment [IW42]: Ike Wilson

CASE EXAMINATION: THE BALKAN WAR(S)

Comment [IW43]: Ike Wilson

Case Study: The Start of the Bosnian War	Susan L. Woodward, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: How Not to End A Civil War," in <i>Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention</i> , pp. 73-87.
Intervention and Ending Internal Conflict - Ideas	Barbara F. Walter, "Designing Transitions from Civil War," in <i>Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention</i> , pp. 38-63.
Intervention and Ending Internal Conflict - Case Studies (Bosnia and multiple other conflicts)	1. Susan Woodward, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: How Not to End A Civil War," in <i>Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention</i> , pp. 87-108. 2. Chaim D. Kaufmann, "When all Else Fails: Evaluating Population Transfers and Partition as Solutions to Ethnic Conflict" in <i>Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention</i> , pp. 221-249.
Who Wins? I	1. Merom, Gil, <i>How Democracies Lose Small Wars</i> , pp. 14-23 2. Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict" pp. 175-200.
Who Wins? II	1. Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III "Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars" <i>International Organization</i> , pp. 67-103 2. John Nagl, <i>Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife</i> , Chapter B "Hard Lessons" pp. 192-208.
After the Shooting Stops	1. Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, "What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone June-August 2003" pp. 18-46 2. Nicholas Sambanis, "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War" pp.437-443, pp. 478-483.

10. Strategic Choices Post 9/11: Afghanistan & Iraq Wars

John Mueller, "Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?" *Foreign Affairs* September/October 2006. *9/11 Commission Report*, "Executive Summary," <http://www.911commission.gov/report/index.htm>

Gaddis, John Lewis Gaddis, "Grand Strategy in the Second Term," *Foreign Affairs* (Jan./Feb. 2005), pp. 2-15.

Benny Miller, "Explaining Change in U.S. Grand Strategy: The Rise of Offensive Liberalism and the War in Iraq," *Security Studies* 19, 1 (January 2010), pp. 26-65.
Abstract. This paper proposes a model for explaining shifts and variations in U.S. grand strategy. The model is based on a distinction between four ideal-type grand strategies or ideational approaches to security according to the objectives and means of security policy: defensive and offensive realism, and defensive and offensive liberalism. While the four approaches are continually present in the U.S. policy community, it is the combination of two systemic conditions—namely the distribution of capabilities and the balance of threat—that selects among the competing approaches and determines which grand strategy is likely to emerge as dominant in a given period. Great power parity is conducive to realist approaches. In contrast, a situation of hegemony encourages the emergence of ideological grand strategies, which focus on ideology promotion, according to the ideology of the hegemon. In the case of a liberal hegemon, such as the United States, liberal approaches are likely to emerge as dominant. In addition, a relative absence of external threat encourages defensive approaches, while a situation of high external threat gives rise to offensive strategies. Thus, various combinations of these systemic factors give rise to the emergence of various grand strategies. This model is tested in two cases of the two most recent shifts in U.S. grand strategy following 1991. In accordance with the expectations of the model, a change in the distribution of capabilities with the end of the Cold War made possible a change from realist to liberal strategies. In the benign environment of the 1990s the dominant strategy was defensive liberalism, while the change in the balance of threat after 9/11 gave rise to the grand strategy of offensive liberalism.

Michael Mann, "The First Failed Empire of the 21st Century," *Review of International Studies*, 30 (2004), pp. 631–653.

Abstract. American foreign policy has been recently dominated by the venture into Iraq. This has not gone well. Most criticism has focused on 'mistakes' – there were not enough US troops, or they were of the wrong type, the Iraqi army was mistakenly disbanded after it surrendered, looting was not anticipated, oil expectations were unreal, the US depended too much on Iraqi exile claims, and so forth. Indeed, these were mistakes. 250,000 troops trained also in police roles would have made a difference. So might Iraqi army units converted into security police. So might better planning all round. But the mistakes were only the surface phenomena of a more profound American failure. The Iraq venture was doomed from the outset by the attempt to create what some neo-conservatives styled a 'New American Empire'. This exaggerated American powers, made facile historical comparisons with previous Empires, mis-identified the enemy, and mis-identified the century we live in. This early twenty-first century attempt at Empire is failing. There will not be others.

G. John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," *Foreign Affairs* 81.5 (Sept.-Oct. 2002): pp. 44-60.

CASE EXAMINATION: THE U.S. / COALITIONAL WAR IN ...AGAINST...FOR IRAQ

Comment [IW44]: Ike Wilson

http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/sean_gourley_on_the_mathematics_of_war.html

***Iraq, Afghanistan, and The War on Terror: a Collection of FRONTLINES reporting from 9/11 to the present"

<http://www.pbs.org/wqwh/pages/frontline/terror/>

Why was there a deliberate plan to fight the war in Iraq but none to win the peace? This question has caused much confusion and consternation among the American public and been the subject of much political wrangling over the past several years. Iraq is just the latest, albeit the most poignant and tragic, case in point. Readings (To be prepared)

Case Study: The Start of the US/Coalitional War Against Saddam Hussein's Iraq	1. The War Behind closed Doors (Frontline video. 52-minutes) -- http://www.pbs.org/wqwh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/view/ 2. On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Center for Army Lessons Learned), 2005.
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	http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/orpoint/
Intervention and Preventive War – Theory	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Wilson III, Isaiah, Major, U.S. Army. "Thinking Beyond War: Civil-Military Operational Planning In Northern Iraq." APSA conference paper (2004) (WEB) 2. James Dobbins, "Iraq: Winning the Unwinnable War," <i>Foreign Affairs</i>, vol. 84, no. 1 3. Chinese Attitudes on Preventive War and the "Preemption Doctrine" by Scott Silverstone (WEB) 4. Changing Tires on the Fly: The Marines and Postconflict Stability Ops. Frank G. Hoffman (September 10, 2006) - http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20060910.military.hoffman.marinespostconflictstabilityops.html#refll
Intervention and Ending Internal Conflict – History (i.e., Case Studies)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Learning From Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy, by Steven Metz, 2007. http://www.dodstoc.com/docs/431975/Metz---learning-from-iraq-counterinsurgency 2. Bush's War—A Two-Part special series that tells the epic story of how the Iraq War began and how it has been fought, both on the ground and deep inside the government. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/bushs-war/
Who Wins? I	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Merom, Gil, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, pp. 14-23 2. Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict" pp. 175-200.
Who Wins? II	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III "Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars" International Organization, pp. 67-103 2. John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Chapter 8 "Hard Lessons" pp. 192-208.
After the Shooting Stops ... ?! (War-Termination)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Iraq War Biggest Mistake in US History - In his follow-up to the number-one New York Times best seller Fiasco, considered a definitive account of the Iraq invasion http://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=fiasco+and+Iraq+War&mid=1156E813303061AA89081156E813303061AA8908&view=detail&FORM=VIREI 2. "My Long War," by Dexter Filkins (August 22, 2008), The New York Times -- http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/24/magazine/24filkins-t.html

CASE EXAMINATION: THE WAR(S) IN ...OF...FOR AFGHANISTAN

Comment [IW45]: Ike Wilson

** RESTREPO (Sebastian Junger and Tim Hetherington) – 93 minutes. Film available on Classesv2 http://www.ted.com/talks/rory_stewart_time_to_end_the_war_in_afghanistan.html

Excerpt from Max Boot's commentaries (The Daily), Friday, October 7, 2011
 In a 'graveyard of empires'—What America must learn from 10 years of Afghanistan war

"For those of us of a certain age, it seems like only yesterday. But it's been 10 years since the start of the Afghanistan war. Circa Oct. 7-8, 2001 — less than a month after the attacks of 9/11 — U.S. aircraft began bombing Taliban positions in Afghanistan. Little more than a month later, on Nov. 13, the Northern Alliance, with the aid of CIA and Special Forces advisers, entered Kabul. On Dec. 22, the suave, English-speaking Hamid Karzai was sworn in as head of a pro-Western provisional government.

The only event that marred those heady days was Osama bin Laden's escape at the battle of Tora Bora in early December. But, considering how badly American forces were supposed to have fared in "the graveyard of empires" — on Oct. 31, R.W. "Johnny" Apple had published a "news analysis" in the New York Times titled "Afghanistan as Vietnam" — events had appeared to work out miraculously well.

So what happened? Why has Afghanistan turned into one of the longest wars in American history? It has already lasted longer than the direct fighting by U.S. troops in Vietnam, its length exceeded only by the conflicts against the Indians from the early 1600s to 1890."

Case Study: The War in Afghanistan Against the Taliban and Al Qaeda	1. "Campaign Against Terror" (PBS) -- http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/
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	<p>2. Obama's War (Frontline video.) http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/obamaswar/</p> <p>3. Afghanistan: A military history from Alexander the Great to the war against the Taliban http://books.google.com.pk/books/about/Afghanistan.html?id=86VlKsDbdKYC</p>
Intervention - Theory	<p>1. "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires," Milton Bearden, <i>Foreign Affairs</i>, Nov/Dec 2001. (WEB)</p> <p>2. Biddle, S. 2003. Afghanistan and the future of warfare. <i>Foreign Affairs</i> 82 (WEB)</p>
Intervention and Ending Internal Conflict - History (i.e., Case Studies) ... "The War FOR Afghanistan" (?)	<p>1. President Obama's West Point Speech -- http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/12/obamas-afghan-policy-speech-at.html</p> <p>http://www.pomед.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/senate-foreign-relations-hearing-9-16.pdf</p> <p>2. Dr. John Nagl SFRC Testimony - http://www.cnas.org/node/3348</p> <p>3. Dr. Stephen Biddle SFRC Testimony - http://www.cfr.org/publication/20220/</p> <p>4. Mr. Rory Stewart SFRC Testimony - http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/testimonies/rory-stewart-on-afghanistan</p>
Who Wins? I	<p>1. Merom, Gil, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, pp. 14-23</p> <p>2. Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict" pp. 175-200.</p>
Who Wins? II	<p>1. Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III "Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars" International Organization, pp. 67-103</p> <p>2. John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Chapter 8 "Hard Lessons" pp. 192-208.</p>
After the Shooting Stops ... ?! (War-Termination)	<p>1. The Wounded Platoon (Frontline video), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/woundedplatoon/view/</p>

11. Contemporary Strategic Issues: Transnational challenges

On Insurgency and Countering Insurgencies

Comment [IW46]: Ike Wilson

Stephen M. Walt, *Revolution and War*, Chapter 2, pp. 18-45.

"The Transition to Urban Insurgency," pp. 151-182.

John Shy and Thomas Collier, *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Ch. 27 "Revolutionary War"

Beckett, Ian, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies*, Ch. 4, "Mao Tse-Tung and Revolutionary Warfare," pp. 70-84, and Ch. 7, "The Transition to Urban Insurgency," pp. 151-182

Max Manwaring and John Fishel, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Toward a pp. 272-276, pp. 285-292)

David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla*, Chapter 1, "The Accidental Guerilla, pp.1-38.

Postmodern Intervention: The Internationalization of Internal Conflict	David Kilcullen, <i>The Accidental Guerilla</i> , Chapter 4, "Terrain, Tribes, and Terrorists," pp. 186-262. And Chapter 5, "Turning an Elephant into a Mouse," pp. 263-289
What is internal conflict?	
Types of internal conflict	<p>1.</p> <p>2. Bernd O'Neill, <i>Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse</i>, Chapter 2, "The Nature of Insurgency" pp. 15-38.</p>

Mao, Rural Insurgency, and Urban Insurgency

Haass, Richard N. 1994. *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World*. Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Introduction to 'Nationalism' Three works:

Donald L. Horowitz. "A Harvest of Hostility: Ethnic Conflict and Self-Determination after the Cold War," UIR 4th edition, pp. 593-614.

Anthony D. Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," UIR 4th edition, pp. 615-625.

Michael E. Brown, "The Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview," UIR 4th edition, pp. 626-642.

Theotónio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," UIR 4th edition, pp. 534-546.

Jack A. Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the CoOld War*, Brookings Institution Press, April 1995.

Romeo Dallaire and Samantha Power. *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, Carroll & Graf, 30 November 2004.

BEYOND COUNTERINSURGENCY: Internationalized Internal Conflicts (IICs):

Comment [IW47]: Ike Wilson

Bobbitt, *Shield of Achilles*, pp. 776-797.

Explanations of Political Violence—Contemporary Context	1. Gurr, Ted Robert. <i>Why Men Rebel</i> , Chapter 1 "Explanations of Political Violence," pp. 3-15. 2. Gurr, Ted Robert. Chapter 2, "Relative Deprivation and the Impetus to Violence," pp. 22-30.
Nationalism, Ethnicity and Internal Conflict	1. James Fearon. "Ethnic Mobilization and Ethnic Violence," pp. 1-12. 2. Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War" pp. 5-33
Economic Causes of Internal Conflict	David Keen, <i>The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil War</i> Chapter 1, "The Economic Benefits of Civil War" pp. 15-22, Chapter 2, "Top-Down Economic Violence," pp. 23-33, Chapter 3, "Bottom-up Economic Violence" pp. 45-54
Criminal and Combined causes of Internal Conflict	1. Paul Collier, "Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity" pp. 839-852 (focus on content, not model) 2. Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War" pp. 1-8, 10-14, pp. 34-35 (focus on content, not models)

Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 2nd edition. Chapter 2 excerpt from Snyder and Mingst, pp. 120-123.

Isaiah Wilson III. *Thinking Beyond War: Civil-Military Relations and Why America Fails to Win the Peace*, Epilogue, pp. 253-260. (Reprint)

Bobbitt, *Shield of Achilles*, pp. 798-807.

Robert Gilpin, *War & Change in World Politics*, Epilogue, pp. 231-244.

Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, London: Polity Press, 2001, pp. 1-152.

Isabelle Duyvesteyn, "Rethinking the Nature of War: Some Conclusions," in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom, eds., *Rethinking the Nature of War*, London: Frank Cass, 2005, pp. 225-241.

12. Contemporary Strategic Issues: Changing Power Relationships

Christensen, Thomas J. "Shaping the Choices of a Rising China: Recent Lessons for the Obama Administration." *The Washington Quarterly* 32.3 (July 2009): pp. 89-104.

Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*

Comment [IW48]: Ike Wilson

Contemporary Issues in Public Policy

Klare, Michael T., *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict*. New York: Owl Books, 2003. *From Publishers Weekly* ~ Klare analyzes the most likely cause of war in the century just begun: demand by rapidly growing populations for scarce resources. An introductory chapter sets the scene, laying out the complexities of rapidly increasing demand as the world industrializes, the concentration of resources in unstable states and the competing claims to ownership of resources by neighboring states. Succeeding chapters look more closely at the potential for conflict over oil in the Persian Gulf and in the Caspian and South China Seas, over water in the Nile Basin and other multinational river systems and over timber, gems and minerals from Borneo to Sierra Leone. The strength of Klare's presentation is its concreteness. His analyses of likely conflicts, for example among Syria, Jordan and Israel for the limited water delivered by the Jordan River, are informed by detailed research into projected usage rates, population growth and other relevant trends. As Klare shows, the same pattern is repeated in dozens of other locations throughout the world. Finite resources, escalating demand and the location of resources in regions torn by ethnic and political unrest all combine as preconditions of war. Klare, an expert on warfare and international security (Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws, etc.),

presents a persuasive case for paying serious attention to these impending hostilities and furnishes the basic information needed to understand their danger and the importance of international cooperation in staving off conflict.

Gore, Albert. *An Inconvenient Truth*. New York: Rodale Books (May 26, 2006) [Book Description from amazon.com] With this book, Gore, who is one of our environmental heroes – and a leading expert – brings together leading-edge research from top scientists around the world; photographs, charts, and other illustrations; and personal anecdotes and observations to document the fast pace and wide scope of global warming. He presents, with alarming clarity and conclusiveness – and with humor, too – that the fact of global warming is not in question and that its consequences for the world we live in will be disastrous if left unchecked. This rioting new book – written in an accessible, entertaining style – will open the eyes of even the most skeptical.

Barry, John. *The Great Influenza*. New York: Viking Press, 2004. From *Publishers Weekly* ~ In 1918, a plague swept across the world virtually without warning, killing healthy young adults as well as vulnerable infants and the elderly. Hospitals and morgues were quickly overwhelmed; in Philadelphia, 4,597 people died in one week alone and bodies piled up on the streets to be carted off to mass graves. But this was not the dreaded Black Death-it was "only influenza." In this sweeping history, Barry (Rising Tide) explores how the deadly confluence of biology (a swiftly mutating flu virus that can pass between animals and humans) and politics (President Wilson's all-out war effort in WWII) created conditions in which the virus thrived, killing more than 50 million worldwide and perhaps as many as 100 million in just a year. Overcrowded military camps and wide-ranging troop deployments allowed the highly contagious flu to spread quickly; transport ships became "floating caskets." Yet the U.S. government refused to shift priorities away from the war and, in effect, ignored the crisis. Shortages of doctors and nurses hurt military and civilian populations alike, and the ineptitude of public health officials exacerbated the death toll. In Philadelphia, the hardest-hit municipality in the U.S., "the entire city government had done nothing" to either contain the disease or assist afflicted families. Instead, official lies and misinformation, Barry argues, created a climate of "fear... [that] threatened to break the society apart." Barry captures the sense of panic and despair that overwhelmed stricken communities and hits hard at those who failed to use their power to protect the public good. He also describes the work of the dedicated researchers who rushed to find the cause of the disease and create vaccines. Flu shots are widely available today because of their heroic efforts, yet we remain vulnerable to a virus that can mutate to a deadly strain without warning. Society's ability to survive another devastating flu pandemic, Barry argues, is as much a political question as a medical one.

Easterly, *The White Man's Burden*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2006. From *Publishers Weekly* ~ No one who attacks the humanitarian aid establishment is going to win any popularity contests, but, neither, it seems, is that establishment winning any contests with the people it is supposed to be helping. Easterly, an NYU economics professor and a former research economist at the World Bank, brazenly contends that the West has failed, and continues to fail, to enact its ill-formed, utopian aid plans because, like the colonialists of old, it assumes it knows what is best for everyone. Existing aid strategies, Easterly argues, provide neither accountability nor feedback. Without accountability for failures, he says, broken economic systems are never fixed. And without feedback from the poor who need the aid, no one in charge really understands exactly what trouble spots need fixing. True victories against poverty, he demonstrates, are most often achieved through indigenous, ground-level planning.

Comment [IW49]: Ike Wilson

13. Interactive Component:

14. Constructing an American Grand Strategy

U.S. National Security Strategy 2010.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf

P.D. Feaver. *American Grand Strategy At the Crossroads: Leading From the Front, Leading From Behind, or Not Leading at All*, "America's Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration. Center for New American Security, May, 2012.

John Mearsheimer, "Imperial by Design," *The National Interest*, Jan-Feb 2011.

Richard N. Haass, "The Age of Nonpolarity: What will Follow U.S. Dominance?," *Foreign Affairs* 87.3 (May-June 2008): pp. 44-56.

Robert Kagan, "The Benevolent Empire," *Foreign Policy* 111 (Summer 1998): pp. 24-35.

Harvey M. Sapolsky, Eugene Gholz, and Caitlin Talmadge, "Chapter 2: America's Security Strategy," in *U.S. Defense Politics: The Origins of Security Policy* (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 14-26.

“The Challenge of Defense Planning in an Era of Dwindling Budgets” Here are some recommended readings and video viewings:

- Gordon Adams on the Slippery Slope of Defense Spending --
<http://cts.vresp.com/c/?TheHenryL.StimsonCen/da445ad07e/9bd6b9fa29/cea9b7a251>

- Gordon Adams on "Building Down" DoD Build Down in an Era of Declining Budgets (Oct 27, 2011)
<http://outerdnn.outer.jhuapl.edu/rethinking/VideoArchives/AdamsPresentationVideo.aspx>

- Max Boot, National Security in an Age of Austerity (1 December 2011)
<http://outerdnn.outer.jhuapl.edu/rethinking/VideoArchives/BootVideoPresentation.aspx>

- Graham Allison, AMERICA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS: A Report from The Commission on America's National Interests
<http://outerdnn.outer.jhuapl.edu/rethinking/VideoArchives/AllisonVideo.aspx>

- August 17, 2009 Dr. Stephen Walt John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
US Foreign Policy & US Power
<http://outerdnn.outer.jhuapl.edu/rethinking/PastSeries/Rethinking20082009.aspx>

- Secretary of State Hilary Clinton NDI Keynote - <http://www.ndi.org/Clinton-delivers-keynote>

Robert M. Gates, "A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age," Foreign Affairs (Jan/Feb 2009), pp. 53-78

Comment [IW50]: Ike Wilson