

PANEL 4. What new literature, approaches, books and articles need to be incorporated into courses on strategy? What is taking place in more basic research that should be fed into the field of security studies?

Emily Goldman. “Cyberspace Strategy”:

The agencies are the consumers of the students we produce.

- There is a paradigm shift (in a Kuhnian sense) underway in cyberspace from deterrence to *persistence*. Longstanding theories are of questionable use because they apply the frames of deterrence, nuclear weapons, and territoriality.
- Biggest source of confusion is *deterrence*. Many in government don't understand the theory. *Deterrence* was an answer to a specific strategic challenge that faced the US in a place and time.
 - When we ask *How to deter cyber attacks?* This is giving the answer without doing the analysis.
 - Need to derive strategy from the strategic environment — not impose a strategy on it.
 - You can defend only in the moment. In cyberspace, we cannot “attrite.” Offense persists. Initiative is key.
- Evidence mounting that what U.S. was doing was not working. The operational forces were seeing this. Turning point in 2016. Have to stop absorbing the attack.
- Key differences between operational realities of physical and cyber domains
 - Restraint rewarded vs persistence rewarded
 - Episodic vs constant contact
 - Actors well known vs not well known
 - Intentions easy vs hard to discern
 - Attribution more difficult
 - Proportional response easy vs hard to calculate
 - Systemic stability emerges from collective inaction vs from collective operational persistence
 - Clausewitzian ways and means vs cyber space ways and means
 - Territorial focused invasions vs sources of power focused engagements
 - Overt violent attacks vs often non-violent cumulative effects
- Competition space v Conflict space. The strategic space below the threshold of armed conflict is as decisive as war and armed conflict.
 - This is the fundamental difference. This is as consequential. Need to get our paradigms correct.
- See Nakasone, Harknett, Fischerkeller

Sara Moller: Alliances and NATO

- Opportunities and challenges, strategy by committee, constant adaptation
- sprawling bureaucracies with 29 actors each with their own bureaucracies.
- Themes when teaching about strategy:
 1. Transparency: too much information; difficulty in sorting; made more difficult in world of fake news.
 2. Strategy by committee:

1. Washington treaty, art 10 specifies the consensus-rule: lowest common denominator.
3. Constant adaptation:
 1. added new tasks like crisis management
 2. enlargement. AFG/ISAF. constant reform of C2.
- Resources:
 1. Official documents. 8 strategic reports starting in 1967, and 3 strategic concepts
 2. Future of the alliance [Harmel Report 1967](#); NATO Strategic Concepts and [their evolution over time](#): 1991, 1999, [2010](#)..
 3. NATO in-house publication: NDC Policy Briefs, and research briefs
 4. NATO elibrary: Library Guides, Archive
 5. Recommended historical novel for teaching NATO alliance politics: Shirreff, [War with Russia](#).
 6. See two-volume set of historical treaties, online. Gibler, CQ Press 2008
 7. [Sayle, Enduring Alliance](#), Cornell 2019, likely a definitive history
 8. Hardt, [Nato's Lessons in Crisis](#), 2018
 9. [Johnston, How Nato Adapts](#). Hopkins 217.

Risa Brooks, Civil-Military Affairs. What's new?

- Have to understand the CMR within the states they're working with. Each state's domestic politics shapes their organization, training, and efficacy.
 - coups
 - defection
 - coup-proofing
 - insubordination
 - political control of military
 - military effectiveness.
- AI AND NEW TECH WILL BRING CULTURAL THREAT TO THE PROFESSION OF ARMS. IDEA OF EXCLUSIVE area of expertise wrong.
- *expect to see a fundamental challenge to the notion of military expertise. and the exclusivity of the military domain*

Nina Tannenwald. Norms and Laws.

- GS need to take into account int'l law and norms. Strategies are bounded. Law is everywhere.
- **Norms are:** 1) A system of neutral rules for behavior; 2) a process of decision-making; 3) a tool of states to achieve strategic political goals; 4) constitutive which creates categories (e.g. combatant and noncombatant)
- **Why law is central to grand strategy:** 1) legal order facilitates a states FP goals. 2) it's a resource for achieving goals and interests, 3) provides framework for diplo activity, 4) provides the framework for conflict.
 - See [Nicholas Rostow \(2012\) "Grand Strategy and International Law."](#)
- How do states use laws and norms to change the international system? Focus on the relationship between law and power.

- Legal and normative **contestation** — not only armed struggle contestation. if the rules-based order is no longer run by the US, then consider where should we expect contestation. Useful to refer to *Ikenberry and Hal Brands* on this question.
 - Read about the global order from another (Brazilian) perspective: Oliver Stuenkel: [The Post-Western World](#) (2016)
 - **Lawfare**. This concept emerged around 2009-10. Originally a negative connotation abs weaker actors would hamper democracies. Targeted at USA and ISR (human shields) to hinder those who take seriously the law of armed conflict. Now understood more broadly as:
 - How states use law to engage in non-kinetic contestation? think of it as *normative* power politics. Strategic social construction.
 - See [Joel Trachtman, “Integrating Lawfare and Warfare”](#). and [Kittrie, Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War](#) (financial war on Iran under Bush)
 - Consider the ways in which lawfare undermines
 - For norm contestation: JSS special issue on topic (ICC, R2P, women in combat).
- Unintended consequences of ILAW. Highly recommend [Tanisha Fazal: Wars of Law](#). consequences of the distancing of the military from the creation of the laws of war. leads to compliance gap. Helps explain why states are no longer declaring war — leads to a IHL gap. Also, Bruce Cronin, [Bugspat: The Politics of Collateral Damage in Western Armed Conflicts](#) (2018). A very important book that analyzes the creation of collateral damage as a logical (and legal) outcome of Western way of fighting but that has increasingly negative political consequences.
- It is helpful to read about norms and law from a non-western perspective

Ivan Arreguin-Toft. Cyber and small wars

- First time as sole male on a panel. Take a picture.
- One note is that we must all figure out our own teaching style. Find the right material and approach for you.
- Movement from conventional kinetic focus. Key metric was “where is the enemy?” we are masters at find/fix/finish. This change is not reflected everywhere strategy is taught.
 - Cyber security strategy: Enjoys using [Modern Strategy](#) by Colin Gray — partly because students often complain its dated. Assign it because it leads to good discussions and sometimes better outcomes than “current” texts.”. Finds that Gray is insecure about...nuclear, cyber, etc. But is on much more solid ground on conventional war – that is fine to point out and let students see it.
- But when you get to Mao, Gandhi. What is the enemy thinking and feeling? need to understand the adversary.
- Also uses poetry, art, and film to connect with students because it disarms students and gives them a way in... 2:53 minute clip from [Gandhi](#)
- Clausewitz on Small Wars. but a hazard of the field, is that the framing that matters. Asymmetric conflict.

Q&A:

- What are the other problematic paradigms of thinking in the military? Other examples of other states going through this gap?
 - We were referred to [Operation Glowing Symphony](#) (CYBERCOM JTF-Ares operation v ISIL). Consider: was this offensive or defensive? Compare it to another operations like the Six-Day War. Also, one member found a shocking insistence that human decision-makers will remain in the loop.
- See Tami Biddle's book on bombing and cognitive dissonance. [Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare](#).
- The panel was asked, "What is fundamentally different in our security environment?" A number of provocative answers were provided.
 1. The role of nonstate actors in making ILAW.
 2. The complexity of the security environment. Agreement with NATO as collective def org. There was an agreed-upon unilateral threat, but now that NATO has gone out of area and taken on other missions, it leads to resource debates about what to fund.
 3. The layering of kinetic, conventional with other forms of warfare. US has decreased the supply of violence and the demand for violence has increased.
 4. The decentralization of politics from institutions to society. Now, who acts are not organized groups but individuals with greater agency.
 5. From US perspective, we face an adversary that is a geostrategic/economic competitor — with an ideology of information control. This cuts to the core of our democratic, western values.
 6. (related) Mil/Intel constraints.
- What's the best analogy for cyber? Bracken in 80s? Bombers jamming radar making bombing of Hamburg possible.
 - Indirect answer was that it's better to remain below the threshold of war and achieve incremental and cumulative effects over time.
 - Another answer was that cyber is not in the military domain. It's owned 85% by private sector. The military doesn't get this yet. Also, adversaries know where NOT to go. No Pearl Harbors coming. They will stay asymmetric, and incremental, below thresholds. Yet getting same strategic effect as if going to war.
- On civil-military relations, it was argued that in the nuclear world, we have a c2 model (Huntington) about how advice giving. But cyber doesn't really operate in the same way.
- What is the good OLD stuff? What are your favorite sources?
 1. Treat films as journal articles. There's a method to break them down. Apocalypse Now and Judgment at Nuremberg. Compare-contrast. Law of war, conventional and spec-ops. Protecting civilians, legitimacy in war. Domino theory.
 2. Kathryn Sikkink, [The Justice Cascade](#). The rise of prosecutions for war crimes. New norms of anti-impunity. Shows the rise of prosecutions came from

Latin America. It's a corrective to the notion that all goodness comes from the north. Brings in the role of social networks and their contribution to making new norms. 3. Remarque, [*All Quiet on the Western Front*](#). [*O'Brien, The Things they Carried*](#). When teaching terrorism: use documentaries. Helps to understand the documentary footage to see the perpetrator and victim.

4. Stanley Milgram's [*Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View*](#). Hannah Arendt. [*Eye in the Sky*](#). [Anything by Paul Fussell](#) (e.g. ["Thank God for the Atom Bomb"](#)).
5. Bernard Brodie, [*The Absolute Weapon*](#). Recognition that the strategic environment has fundamentally changed.